

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 2995

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, PFOR, UR, US
SUBJECT: KORNIYENKO'S LUNCH FOR AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 45689

1. SUMMARY: DURING MARCH 3 LUNCH FOR AMBASSADOR, FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE TOUCHED UPON TO VARYING DEGREES IN CONVERSATION: SECRETARY'S VISIT, SALT, CTB, MIDDLE EAST, CIVIL AIR AND MARITIME MATTERS AND CHANCERY CONSTRUCTION. SOVIET COMMENTS GAVE NO HINT OF CHANGE IN PREVIOUSLY STATED SOVIET VIEWS ON THESE SUBJECTS, BUT LUNCH CONDUCTED IN GENERALLY AMICABLE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIETS MADE NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO U.S. STATEMENTS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS NOR TO RECENT OFFICIAL EXCHANGES REGARDING THE EMBASSY'S CONTACT WITH DISSIDENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO HOSTED A LUNCH IN THE AMBASSADOR'S HONOR MARCH 3, WHICH WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY DCM, POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COUNSELORS AND FIVE OFFICERS OF MFA USA DIVISION. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS AMICABLE DESPITE THE FRANK DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON MOST OF THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED. KORNIYENKO'S TOAST WAS GRACIOUS AND FORWARD LOOKING IN EMPHASIZING HIS DESIRE TO WORK FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, AN APPROACH WHICH
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THE AMBASSADOR SECONDED IN HIS ANSWERING TOAST. THE FOLLOWING TOPICS OF INTEREST AROSE DURING THE CONVERSATION:

3. SECRETARY VANCE'S VISIT: KORNIYENKO SAID THAT NO DETAILS HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED REGARDING THE SECRETARY'S PLANS REGARDING THE SIZE OF HIS PARTY,. 5#3 NUMBER OF ACCOMPANYING PRESS

REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LIKE, BUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MUCH EXPERIENCE IN RECEIVING SECRETARY KISSINGER AND THEREFORE SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM MEETING SECRETARY VANCE'S DESIRES. HE EXPRESSED, HOWEVER, SOME INTEREST IN THE PROBABLY SIZE OF THE PRESS CONTINGENT. THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT WE DO NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE MECHANICS OF THE VISIT, BUT, NOTING USE OF STATE SECURITY DETAIL FOR ME VISIT, OBSERVED THAT IN SOME RESPECTS SECRETARY VANCE'S PROCEDURES AND CERTAINLY SIZE OF PARTY MAY DIFFER FROM FORMER SECRETARY KISSINGER'S.

4. SALT: IN VERY BRIEF COMMENT ON SALT, KORNIYENKO SAID THAT SOME OF U.S. SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS AND IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER DETAIL IT IS DIFFICULT TO FORMULATE A SOVIET POSITION ON THEM.

5. CTB: AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS APPROACHES TO THE CTB DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, AND NOT MAKE COMMITTEE OF 26 FOCAL POINT FOR DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE. KORNIYENKO INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS CTB WITH SECRETARY, BUT "COULD NOT IGNORE" COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY U.N. REGARDING SUBSTANCE OF U.S. PROPOSAL, HE ASKED WHETHER IT MEANT TO COVER ALL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS OR ONLY WEAPONS TESTS. AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT DETAILS WILL BE CLARIFIED IN DUE COURSE, BUT THAT IT WAS HIS PRESUMPTION THAT IF PNE'S WERE NOT COVERED, A CLOSE LOOK WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN AT PNE TREATY TO MAKE SURE THAT IT PROVIDED ADEQUATE MEANS OF VERIFICATION UNDER CONDITIONS

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OF CTB, AS CONTRASTED WITH THRESHOLD TEST BAN FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNED.

6. MIDDLE EAST: KORNIYENKO ASKED WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS EXPERIENCE AS AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL, THE AMBASSADOR IS, IN ONE WORD, AN OPTIMIST OR A PESSIMIST REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOREARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT HE IS A PESSIMIST, ON THE BASIS OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE EMOTIONS INVOLVED, BUT THAT HE NEVERTHELESS CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE USSR DID NOT FIND ITSELF HANDICAPPED BY BEING IN CONTACT REGULARLY WITH PARTIES - AND NOT ALL OF THEM - TO ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE DISPUTE. KORNIYENKO ADMITTED THAT "OF COURSE THERE ARE SOME PRACTICAL DISADVANTAGES," BUT THAT THE SOVIET POSITION IS ONE OF PRINCIPLE WHICH WOULD NOT CHANGE.

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7. KORNIYENKO THEN DELIVERED A LONG LECTURE ALONG FAMILIAR LINES REGARDING THE SOVIET POSITION ON RETURN OF ALL TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL AFTER THE 1967 WAR, ALLEGED SOVIET EFFORTS TO "WARN" THE U.S. IN 1973 OF THE DANGER OF ARMED CONFLICT, THE PORBABILITY THAT U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION COULD HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT AN ME SETTLEMENT SHORTLY AFTER THAT CONFLICT, AND THE SOVIET VIEW THAT U.S. POLICY HAS MDE THE SITUATION WORSE RATHER THAN BETTER. THE AMBASSADOR TOOK ISSUE WITH HIM REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF U.S. POLICY AND PRESSED HIM REGARDING THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET "WARNING" IN 1973, ASKING SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF ARAB PLANS. KORNIYENKO CLAIMED THAT THE "WARNINGS" WERE GENERAL, BEGUN DURING BREZHNEV'S JUNE 1973 VISIT TO U.S. AND WERE BASED ON THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND NOT ON SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF ARAB MILITARY PLANS. QUERIED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THEWITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM DAMASCUS THREE DAYS BEFORE THE ARAB ATTACK, KORNIYENKO SAID THAT WAS DONE BECAUSE THE SITUATION WAS DEEMED CRITICALLY DANGEROUS, NOT BECAUSE OF SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE MILITARY INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT HE WAS GLAD TO BE REASSURED ON THIS POINT, SINCE IN HIS VIEW, IF THE SOVIETS HAD KNOWN OF ARAB INTENTIONS AND HAD NOT NOTIFIED US, THEY WOULD HAVE VIOLATED THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1973 PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT.

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8. KORNIYENKO INQUIRED ABOUT SECRETARY VANCE'S ME VISIT,

AND AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT WE CONSIDERED IT A USEFUL EXPLORATION OF THE VIEWS OF THE PARTIES, NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD BRIEFED DOBRYNIN ON THE TRIP, AND EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE CRITICAL LINE TAKEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS REGARDING OUR CURRENT EFFORTS IN AREA. KORNIYENKO OBSERVED ON THE LATTER POINT THAT THE SECRETARY'S VISIT APPEARED TO BE FRUITLESS, AND THE AMBASSADOR COUNTERED THAT IT WAS NEVER PRESENTED AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN A FACT-FINDING MISSION.

9. CIVIL AVIATION: KORNIYENKO MENTIONED THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN OUR CIVIL AVIATION RELATIONS. WHEN THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT THIS IS ONE ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE EASILY SETTLED IF THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS WOULD APPROACH IT IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT, KORNIYENKO REITERATED THE FAMILIAR CHARGE THAT THINGS WERE FINE BETWEEN AEROFLOT AND PAN AMERICAN UNTIL THE USG REJECTED THE INTERLINE AGREEMENT. U.S. POSITION ON THIS POINT WAS EXPLAINED, AND DURING LENGTHY CONVERSATION WHICH ENSUED, SOVIETS MADE FOLLOWING POINTS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST:

A. THEY HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A BALANCED REVENUE POOLING ARRANGEMENT, IF THE TERMS ARE ACCEPTABLE;

B. CHARTER FLIGHTS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM POOLING CALCULATIONS SINCE U.S. OPERATES MORE CHARTERS THAN AEROFLOT;

C. THEY ARE UNAWARE OF ANY "NEW PROPOSAL" BY DOBRYNIN AND CONSIDER BALL IN U.S. COURT ON CIVIL AVIATION NEGOTIATIONS.

10. WE REITERATED THAT BASIC PROBLEM IS AEROFLOT'S UNWILLINGNESS TO INSURE PAN AMERICAN FAIR TREATMENT ON THE ROUTE AND TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FULLY RECIPROCAL BENEFITS. WE ALSO NOTED THAT SOVIET VIOLATION OF THE 1966 CONFIDENTIAL

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BILATERAL IN REGARD TO TICKETING PERSISTS. THE AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC BY STATING THAT IT WOULD BE MOST DESIRABLE TO SETTLE THIS PROBLEM BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S VISIT SO THAT IT WOULD NOT TAKE UP TIME WHICH COULD BE BETTER DEVOTED TO MORE IMPORTANT TOPICS.

11. MARITIME AGREEMENT: THE AMBASSADOR REMARKED THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE MOST DESIRABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINING MARITIME ISSUE. SOVIETS CONTENDED THAT DISPUTE OVER DEFINITION OF BILATERAL CARGO RESULTED FROM UNREASONABLE U.S. DEMAND, WHILE WE COUNTERED THAT SOVIETS HAD PRECIPITATED ISSUE BY ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE THE DEFINITION SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENT, AND THAT THIS DEMAND SHOULD BE ABANDONED SO AS TO PERMIT RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM.

12. CHANCERY CONSTRUCTION: AMBASSADOR REMINDED KORNIYENKO THAT WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR SOVIET COMMENTS ON OUR ARCHITECTURAL PLANS FOR NEW CHANCERY, AND THAT THESE HAD BEEN CONVEYED IN APRIL AND ALL TRANSLATIONS AND SUPPLEMENTARY DATA IN AUGUST. KORNIYENKO GAVE NO HINT OF WHEN WE COULD EXPECT SOVIET COMMENT, AND WHEN ASKED ABOUT DELIVERY OF APARTMENTS PREVIOUSLY PROMISED, REMARKED THAT SINCE WE ARE UNWILLING TO ALLOW SOVIETS TO PROCEED WITH APARTMENT CONSTRUCTION IN WASHINGTON, ALL OUR REQUESTS WILL HAVE TO TAKE THEIR TURN AMONG THE MANY DEMANDS OF OTHER DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN MOSCOW. AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED PARTICULAR NECESSITY TO ACQUIRING NEW SCHOOL BUILDING SINCE CURRENT ONE CANNOT MEET FIRE SAFETY STANDARDS, AND RECENT FIRES HAVE MADE CLEAR THE DANGER WE ARE RUNNING. KORNIYENKO GAVE NO CLEAR REPLY ON THIS POINT, BUT ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE IMPRESSION THAT EMBASSY WILL RECEIVE FEW, IF ANY, OF THE FACILITIES IT HAS REQUESTED.

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